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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO DOUBT AS TO THE COMMISSION'S 
MEANING WHEN IT HELD THAT IT WAS "WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION" TO ACT IN 1976. 
One of respondent's first arguments in his brief is that the 
Commission did in fact have jurisdiction when it issued the Order 
of December 9f 1976f and that a decision was rendered on the 
merits of the case. According to the plain language of the 1976 
decision, the respondent's statement is simply not true. The 
Commission was very clear when it stated: 
The cases clearly show that the three year 
statute does apply in this case and that the 
application of the statute of limitations 
requiring a filing within three years Ls. 
jurisdictional and not discretionary with the 
Commission. If the claimant failed to file 
an application within three years after the 
date of injury or the payment of last compen-
sation, no matter how equitable the claim may 
be, the Commission is without jurisdiction to 
do other than dismiss the application. 
(Emphasis added.) (R.36.) 
The applicant goes on to state that the term "without juris-
diction" was used by the Administrative Law Judge in a "general 
sense as the equivalent of "without discretion," (Respondent's 
brief, p.5.) However, as indicated above, the December 9, 1976 
Order was very clear as to its meaning of "jurisdiction". The 
Order was pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-99 as it read 
at that time: 
. . . If no claim for compensation is filed 
with the industrial commission within three 
years from the date of the accident or the 
date of the last payment of compensation, the 
right to compensation shall be wholly barred. 
The above-quoted section should be construed in conjunction 
with Utah Code Ann., Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 as it read at 
the time of the 1976 Order: 
Whenever an employee sustains an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his 
employment it shall be mandatory that the 
employee file with the commission in writing 
notice of such accident with a copy to the 
employer; if such notice is so filed within 
three years of the time of the accident the 
commission shall obtain jurisdiction to make 
its award when the injury becomes apparent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Since the applicant Robert Vale failed to file the necessary 
notice of his accident with the Commission in accordance with the 
terms of Sections 35-1-99 and 100, the Commission never obtained 
jurisdiction over Mr. Vale's claim in the first place, which was 
the Commission's Order at the time. The definition of 
jurisdiction as it appears in Section 35-1-100 should be taken at 
its plain meaning, which is the "power and authority of a court to 
hear and determine a judicial proceeding." Black's Law Dictionary 
766 (5th ed. 1979). 
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That the Legislature intended sections 35-1-99 and 100 
to be considered together for the purposes of conferring juris-
diction on the Commission becomes clear upon reading the 1981 
amendment to Section 35-1-100: 
Whenever an employee sustains an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his 
employment, the employee shall file with the 
commission/ in writing, notice of such 
accident, with a copy to the employer; if 
such notice is so filed within three years of 
the time of the accident or within the time 
limitation provided in section 35-1-99, the 
commission shall obtain jurisdiction to make 
its award when the injury becomes apparent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Inasmuch as the language of the 1976 Order, together with 
the statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Commission are clear 
as to the definition of jurisdiction in the context of the 
present case, respondent's argument on this point must fail. 
Furthermore, the Commission's Order of 1976 cannot be ) ^ 
characterized as a decision on the merits because the applicant's 
claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the \ 
merits. Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-78 does not apply because, 
as argued before, in order to exercise continuing jurisdiction 
pursuant to that section, the Commission must first obtain 
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Sections 35-1-99 and 100. 
POINT II 
THE 1976 ORDER DISMISSING APPLICANT'S CLAIM 
INCLUDED CLAIMS FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED 
AFTER THE ORDER. 
On p a g e 7 o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r i e f , h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n ' s O r d e r of 1976 b a r r e d c l a i m s f o r m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s 
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prior to the time of the Order but not claims for medical expenses 
incurred after the Order. This argument, however, is unfounded. 
In its Order dated December 9, 1976, the Commission relied on 
Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-99 which wholly bars the right to 
compensation if no claim is filed within three years of the 
accident or the last compensation payment. A claim which is 
wholly barred must include past as well as future medical expenses 
at the time the claim is barred. Future medical expenses can 
only be based on the industrial accident that is the root of the 
rights provided for in Workers1 Compensation Act of Utah, 35-1-1, 
et seq. If the root or basis for a claim is gone, the future 
incurrence of expenses cannot revive a dead claim. There is no 
doubt that the Commission intended to deny the claim for past as 
well as future medical benefits in the 1976 Order. 
POINT III 
THE INSURANCE FUND'S PAYMENT OF MEDICAL 
EXPENSES IN 1975 DID NOT TOLL THE RUNNING OF 
THE THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In footnote 1 of respondent's brief, he argues that since 
the Insurance Fund made a payment of medical expenses on September 
17, 1975, the three-year statute of limitations was satisfied 
because Mr. Vale filed his claim less than a year after the 1975 
payment. This argument is also unfounded because the case law in 
1976, as well as at present, is clear that such a payment by the 
Insurance Fund does not toll the running of the statute of 
limitations. This issue was also addressed by the Administrative 
Law Judge in his December 9, 1976 Order. (R. pp. 34-35.) 
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In the case of Jones v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 
28, 404 P.2d 27 (1965) the claimant was last attended by a doctor 
more than three years before he filed a claim with the Commission, 
The employer failed to pay the doctor bill until more than three 
years after the medical service. The claimant alleged that the 
employer's payment of medical expenses after the three-year 
period tolled the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Industrial Commission denying the applicant's 
claim, holding that the payment of such medical expenses did not 
toll the statute of limitations contained in Section 35-1-99, Utah 
Code Annotated. The holding in Jones is precisely on point in 
the present case where the employer paid some medical expenses on 
September 17, 1975, and the statute of limitations had run as of 
August 23, 1974. See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission. 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979) (n[I]t is our conclusion that 
the furnishing of and payment for medical services to the appli-
cant does not extend the statute of limitation [35-1-99] and that 
his filing of his application more than three years after his 
alleged injury came too late." 597 P.2d at 878.) 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ARE MISLEADING, 
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT FACT SITUATION, 
AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED. 
On page 8 of respondent's brief, he argues that "even if the 
1977 ruling of the Industrial Commission were found to be a ruling 
on the question of subject matter jurisdiction, that question can 
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be r e l i t i g a t e d where, as here , f [a ] l lowing the judgment to stand 
would s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n f r i n g e on t h e a u t h o r i t y of a n o t h e r 
t r i b u n a l 1 . " Respondent c i t e s Section 12(2) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments as au thor i ty for t h i s argument. However, 
Sec t ion 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments appl ies to 
s i t u a t i o n s where a c o u r t has e x e r c i s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n over an 
a c t i o n and rendered judgment, not where, as here , the court has 
denied subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n a l t oge the r . The sect ion in i t s 
e n t i r e t y reads as fol lows: 
S e c t i o n 1 2 . C o n t e s t i n g S u b j e c t M a t t e r 
J u r i s d i c t i o n 
When a c o u r t has r e n d e r e d a judgment in 
c o n t e s t e d ac t ion , the judgment precludes the 
p a r t i e s from l i t i g a t i n g the question of the 
c o u r t ' s s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n in 
subsequent l i t i g a t i o n except i f : 
(1) The s u b j e c t matter of the act ion was so 
p l a i n l y beyond the c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n tha t 
i t s e n t e r t a i n i n g the a c t i o n was a manifest 
abuse of au tho r i ty ; or 
(2) A l l o w i n g t h e judgment to s tand would 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n f r i n g e t h e a u t h o r i t y of 
another t r ibuna l or agency of government; or 
(3) The judgment was rendered by a cou r t 
l a c k i n g c a p a b i l i t y t o make an adequa t e ly 
informed determination of a question concern-
ing i t s own j u r i s d i c t i o n and as a matter of 
p r o c e d u r a l f a i r n e s s the p a r t y seek ing to 
avoid the judgment should have oppo r tun i t y 
b e l a t e d l y t o a t t a c k t h e c o u r t ' s s u b j e c t 
matter j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Section 12 (1982). Since the 
foregoing Section of the Restatement c l ea r ly appl ies to s i t u a t i o n s 
on ly where a c o u r t has e x e r c i s e d j u r i s d i c t i o n in a m a t t e r , 
respondent ' s argument on t h i s point must f a i l . Furthermore, even 
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i £ t h i s s e c t i o n d i d a pp 1 y , i t w o i 11 d be o f n o c o n s e q u e n c e b e c a u s e 
t h e C omm i s s i o n ! s d e c i s i o n o £ D e c e m b e r 9 , 1 9 8 6 , d i d n o t l,f s u b s t a n -
t i a 11 y i n f r i n g e :> n t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a n o t h e r t r i b u n a 1" bee a u s e t h e 
C o in, m i s s i o n ; / a s t h e p r o p e i: 11 : :i b u i i. • 3 ] , a u 1 ii o i: i z e d t : I: i e • a r t h < 2 : 3 a i ra 
a n d r e n d e r a d e c i s i o n t h e r e o n , w 1 i i c h d e c i s i o n w a s i n t o t a I 
harbor. ; virr , tr^< 13v, < ^ -*- m i n t e d ar : i t t ime . 
F • . :i 1 6 : f t i ie IF Tt! ..Lament 
(Second"1 o : J * .on.^..(~ .- • - a ^ o .ui s i e n d i n g . He r e p r e s e n t s t h a t 
S e c : ; A n " - a l lows "for sec t A r : i i s i u t . • , a jdcrr.enL, sach as 
t h e 1 ' : r :•r , whicb was ca: :ec ?n an ear 1 1 er : ur.g^ent
 f such as 
rulings oric - Kennecoc: Copper ar.u Christensen > and vnen vas 
Chr istensen . .esponuent ' -i ir :e: 3* - "lie encire section 
states: 
Section 16- Judgment Based Upon a Judgment 
That Is Subsequently Reversed 
A judgment based on an earlier: judgment is 
not nullified automatically by reason of the 
setting aside, or reversal on appeal, or 
other nullification of that earlier judgment; 
but the later judgment may be set aside, in 
appropriate proceedings, with provision for 
any suitable restitution cf benefits received 
under it. 
Restatement -Secure; , ;. Judgments Section 16 (1982), Comment(a) 
of Section 1c illustrates the face situation to which the section 
applies : 
a . How t h e p rob lem a r i s e s . Under Sect ion 
1 3 , Comments f and g, a judgment in an ac t ion 
may be regarded as f i n a l for purposes of r e s 
'• j u d i c a t a , and be e n t i t l e d t o c o n c l u s i v e 
e f f e c t i n a s econd a c t i o n , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g 
. • • t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s s t i ] 3 1 i a b 1 e t o be 
; 
n u l l i f i e d , for example, by a post- judgment 
motion such as a motion for a new t r i a l f or 
by r e v e r s a l on a p p e a l . If judgment i s 
rendered in the second act ion on the bas i s of 
the judgment in the f i r s t , and the judgment 
in the f i r s t i s then n u l l i f i e d , the problem 
a r i s e s what i s t o happen t o t h e second, 
dependent judgment. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, §16 comment a (1982). Section 
16, then, re fe r s to judgments based on an e a r l i e r ru l ing in the 
same case t h a t i s subsequently reversed. I t has nothing to do 
with judgments based upon case law in o the r a c t i o n s which i s 
subsequently modified. 
F i n a l l y , respondent a rgues t h a t under Section 83(2)(d) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the " ru les of res jud ica ta 
do not apply to an adminis t ra t ive decision if the decis ion i s not 
f i n a l . " Respondent's Brief a t 8. The sect ion in question reads 
in re levant p a r t : 
§83. Ad jud i ca t i ve Determination by Admini-
s t r a t i v e Tribunal 
(1) Except as s ta ted in Subsections (2) , (3) , 
and ( 4 ) , a v a l i d and f i n a l a d j u d i c a t i v e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r ibuna l 
has the same e f f e c t s under the ru les of res j u d i c a t a , subject to the same exceptions and 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , as a judgment of a cour t . 
(2) An a d j u d i c a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by an 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l i s conclusive under 
the ru les of res jud ica ta only insofar as the 
p r o c e e d i n g r e s u l t i n g in the d e t e r m i n a t i o n 
e n t a i l e d the e s s e n t i a l elements of adjudica-
t i o n , including: 
(a) Adequate not ice to persons who are to be 
bound by the ad judica t ion , as s t a t ed in §2; 
(b) The r i g h t on b e h a l f of a p a r t y to 
p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and l e g a l a rgument in 
suppor t of the p a r t y ' s content ions and f a i r 
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opportunity to rebu t evidence and argument by 
opposing p a r t i e s ; 
(c) A formulation of i s s u e s of 1 aw and f ac t 
in terms of the a p p l i c a t i o n of r u l e s with 
r e s p e c t to s p e c i f i e d p a r t i e s concern ing a 
s p e c i f i c t r a n s a c t i o n , s i t u a t i o n , or s t a t u s , 
or a s p e c i f i c s e r i e s t h e r e o f ; 
(a . ; i *-:• or f i n a l i t y , s p e c - f . i n g J
 t c : .* \ 
i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g wnen p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e 
t e r m i n a t e d and ?. :\ ra . dec i s ion = rendered ; 
and 
(e) Such o ther procedural elements as may 
be n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s t i t u t e the proceeding a 
•.•-. s u f f i c i e n t means of c o n c l u s i v e l y determining 
the matter in ques t ion , having regard for t he 
magnitude and c o m p l e x i t y of t h e matter i n 
q u e s t i o n , the urgency with which the mat te r 
must be reso lved , and the opportunity of t he 
p a r t i e s t o o b t a i n e v i d e n c e and formulate 
l e g a l content ions . 
A c c o r d i n g t c :: a s e a 1 1 d s t a t u t o r y J a w a s i t € • x i s t e d a t 11: 1 e t i n: »e 0 £ 
the December 197 6 decision, the decision was final. It makes no 
difference that under the later Kennecott Copper or Christensen 
decisions a claim for medical expenses may be appropriate in a 
case where there was n0 fina1 determination of entitlement. 
R e s p o n d e n t h a s n o t p r o v i d e d a 1 1 y p e r s \ 1 a s i v e a 1 11 h o r i t y i n d I c a t i n g 
that these two decisions should be given retroactive effect. The 
Frank v. Mangum decision, 237 U.S. 309, 59 L. Ed., 969 (1915) was 
c i t e d by r e s po nd e n I: a s s t a n d i n g £ :> r t h e p 1: o po s i t i o 1 1 11 1 a t " j u d i c i a 1 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s extend to all times past and supercede prior 
' erroneo 11 s 0r i nc0nsistent decisi0ns . f " That case merely held 
that er rone- D U S • :)i: i 1 ico • *. - it deed,si ons by the courts are not 
reached by the prohibition of the U.S. Constitution, article 1 
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S10f against ex post facto laws, but that such provision is 
directed against legislative action only, 
CONCLUSION 
Under the doctrine of res judicata the Industrial 
Commission's Order of May 17
 f 1977 was a final determination of 
Mr, Vale's claim which cannot be modified or changed by any later 
case decisions of the Supreme Court. The 1977 decision was in 
harmony with the law as it existed at that time, and it makes no 
difference that later decisions such as Kennecott Copper or 
Christensen may have changed the outcome. The applicant could 
have had the input of the Supreme Court on his case had he chosen 
to appeal the decision which he did not do. The purpose behind 
the doctrine of res judicata of giving decisions finality and 
promoting the policy of ending disputes will be best served by 
reversing or vacating the Commission's Order of July 12, 1985. 
DATED thisc^H- daY o f March, 1986. 
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